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YOUR NATURAL GAS IS NOT CYBER-SECURE: A TWO-FOLD
CASE FOR WHY VOLUNTARY NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES SHOULD BECOME MANDATORY
REGULATIONS OVERSEEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Madeline A Labovitz *
In the past two decades, the United States has increased the
production and use of natural gas to fuel every day American life.
This increase has resulted in the construction of millions of miles of
natural gas pipelines. While this development has produced a
number of benefits, natural gas pipelines have introduced the threat
of cyberattacks on natural gas infrastructure. This substantial threat
is currently managed by voluntary guidelines promulgated by the
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”). While the private
industry is satisfied to maintain the status quo and leave these
threats essentially self-regulated, voluntary guidelines are not
sufficient to defend against the cybersecurity threats posed to
natural gas pipelines. This Recent Development proposes that
cybersecurity standards should become mandatory and that the
Department of Energy, not TSA, is the proper agency to promulgate
mandatory cybersecurity regulations.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Today, the U.S. is the world’s largest natural gas producer. 1 By
2020, the U.S. is projected to be the world’s third largest exporter of
liquified natural gas. 2 Natural gas is a volatile and dangerous product
generally transported by pipelines that have largely computerized
1
See SARAH LADISLAW ET AL., U.S. NATURAL GAS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1
(2017); Alex Dewar et al., Preparing for an Abundance of US Natural Gas,
BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.bcg.com/publications/
2019/united-states-us-abundance-natural-gas.aspx [https://perma.cc/QZ77CPRG].
2
Dewar et al., supra note 1.
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operations. 3 While computerization has allowed the millions of
miles of American pipelines to operate efficiently, the technology
has rendered natural gas pipelines vulnerable to sophisticated
cyberattacks from adversaries. 4
To combat this threat, cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines has
been left exclusively to the Transportation Security Administration
(“TSA”). 5 TSA, to the satisfaction of the private industry, has only
released voluntary guidelines leaving natural gas pipelines
essentially self-regulated. 6 However, there has been push back by
policy makers and agencies to vest different agencies with the ability
to exact stronger natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations. 7
In Part II, this article will discuss the background of natural gas
in the U.S. and the general risks posed by natural gas production and
transportation. As the interdependency between natural gas
pipelines and the electric grid is steadily increasing, Part III will
discuss the cybersecurity threats energy infrastructure faces in
general. Part IV will specifically describe the cybersecurity threats
posed to natural gas pipelines. Part V will detail the regulatory
scheme, or lack thereof, in place to address and combat natural gas
pipeline cybersecurity threats. Part VI will argue that the voluntary
guidelines that currently instruct natural gas pipeline cybersecurity
should be mandatory. Finally, Part VII will advocate that as the
See How Does the Natural Gas Delivery System Work?, AMERICAN GAS
ASS’N, https://www.aga.org/natural-gas/delivery/how-does-the-natural-gasdelivery-system-work-/ [https://perma.cc/VR6F-9FT9].
4
See Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
112th Cong. 3 (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of Information
Security Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590367.pdf.
5
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-48, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT
WEAKNESSES IN TSA’S PIPELINE SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 1 (2018).
6
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN.: PIPELINE SECURITY GUIDELINES 1
(2018).
7
See Rebecca Kern, Looming Cybersecurity Battle: Who Protects U.S.
Pipelines?, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 22, 2018), https://news.bloomberg
environment.com/environment-and-energy/looming-cybersecurity-battle-whoprotects-us-pipelines-corrected [https://perma.cc/4Z99-VR98]; Blake Sobczak,
Battle lines form over pipeline cyberthreat, E&E NEWS (July 25, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060784805 [https://perma.cc/VW7F-P3WF].
3
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guidelines become mandatory regulations, the Department of
Energy (“DOE”), not TSA, should be the agency to promulgate
natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.
II.

BACKGROUND OF NATURAL GAS IN THE UNITED STATES
Natural gas use is not confined to electricity generation; it is a
versatile and multi-use product. 8 Natural gas has become an
essential staple for most Americans. 9 Not only does natural gas heat
one half of U.S. residents’ homes and is used to cook their food, but
natural gas is used for fuel, and for backup generators. 10 Further, as
coal becomes obsolete, natural gas has become its replacement. 11
Natural gas’ prominence in the U.S. has grown considerably in
recent decades to account for 31% of U.S. primary energy
consumption today. 12 In the U.S., 34.1% of natural gas is used for
fuel, 31.3% is used for industrial purposes, and 20.7% is used for
cooking and heating. 13 Least substantially, 13.8% of natural gas is
used for commercial purposes and 0.1% is used for vehicle fuel. 14
Though natural gas plays such a significant role in American
life, as recently as 2005, the U.S. was highly dependent on foreign
Hobart M. King, Uses of Natural Gas, GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/
articles/natural-gas-uses/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R8KDTBBF].
9
See id.
10
Id.; History of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, DIRECT ENERGY,
https://www.directenergy.com/learning-center/energy-choice/history-of-naturalgas-industry (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VP2Z-TUWU].
11
History of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, supra note 10.
12
U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/D9QGCUCJ]; Glossary of Statistical Term: Primary Energy Consumptions, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=2112 (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B52H-EGXE].
“Primary energy consumption refers to the direct use at the source, or supply to
users without transformation, of crude energy, that is, energy that has not been
subjected to any conversion or transformation process.” Id. Natural gas accounts
for the second largest percentage of U.S. primary energy consumption.
Petroleum makes up the largest percentage accounting for 36% of U.S. primary
energy consumption. Id.
13
King, supra note 8.
14
Id.
8
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imports of natural gas to meet demand. 15 This dependence led to
historically high natural gas prices and predictions that the U.S.
would experience a natural gas crisis in 2005. 16 However, the high
prices, increasing demand, and continued reliance on foreign
imports pushed the U.S. industry towards innovation. In the early
2000s, hydraulic fracturing was combined with horizontal drilling
to enable, for the first time, oil and gas production from U.S. shale
formations. 17
Instead of the predicted natural gas crisis, in 2005, the new
techniques led the U.S. to a natural gas boom and domestic
production outpaced domestic need in 2015. 18 The increase in
production, caused natural gas prices to plummet, decreasing from
$13.42 per million BTUs in 2005 to $2.65 per million BTUs by the
end of 2019. 19 The decreasing cost and increasing demand for
natural gas, specifically in 2009, resulted in the construction of new
natural gas pipelines. 20 Today, the U.S. contains nearly 3 million
miles of pipelines used to deliver the approximately 30 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas produced in the U.S. 21
15
Natural Gas Explained: Use of Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July
10, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/use-of-naturalgas.php [https://perma.cc/7A8T-TC8C]; see LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1.
16
See LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1.
17
Id.; Robert Rapier, How the Shale Boom Turned the World Upside Down,
FORBES (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/04/21/howthe-shale-boom-turned-the-world-upside-down/#7ef8bfa777d2
[https://perma.cc/9GPE-923C]. Hydraulic fracturing is technique that has been
around since the 1940s that pumps water and a variety of chemicals down an oil
or gas well to fracture reservoir rock and release natural gas. Id.
18
See LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1; Rapier, supra note 17.
19
Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gaspipelines.php [https://perma.cc/F6NP-ZGF6]; Natural Gas: Henry Hub Natural
Gas Spot Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/
hist/rngwhhdM.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S25GVBUN]. A “BTU” is a British Thermal Unit.
20
Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 19.
21
Id.; Natural Gas Explained: Where Our Natural Gas Comes From, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php [https://perma.cc/U72ALMMM]; James Chen, Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf), INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trillion-cubic-feet.asp
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While natural gas plays a critical role in U.S. life and economy,
there are some inherent dangers associated with natural gas use and
production that amplify the danger of cybersecurity threats. For
example, poorly maintained equipment can result in carbon
monoxide poisoning. 22 Natural gas pipelines can also leak, leading
to explosions. 23 Moreover, the computerization of natural gas
pipelines has also led to unintentional damage as “software upgrades
and defective equipment” can “inadvertently disrupt systems” and
cause damage. 24
Even absent a cybersecurity threat from an adversary,
natural gas accidents in the U.S. have resulted in widespread service
disruption, serious destruction and even death. For example, a
natural gas pipeline exploded in San Francisco in 2019 when a
construction company accidentally cut into the natural gas main. 25
The explosion, described as shooting a “tower of flames into the
sky,” seriously damaged a number of buildings. 26 Also in 2019, a
natural gas pipeline in Durham, North Carolina caused an explosion

[https://perma.cc/AC7F-RNXS]. Natural gas increased to 30 Tcf from 19.18 Tcf
of natural gas produced at the start of 2000. “Trillion cubic feet,” or Tcf, is the
unit used by the oil and gas industry to measure natural gas. The measurement
can be difficult to quantify, and it is most commonly equated to one quadrillion
of a British thermal unit, which represents the amount of heat “required to raise
the temperature of a single pound of water by one-degree Fahrenheit at sea
level.” Id.
22
Natural Gas Safety, OHIO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N,
https://www.puco.ohio.gov/be-informed/consumer-topics/natural-gas-safety/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5WK6-6MJS].
23
Id.
24
Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec., supra note
4.
25
Dan Noyes, What We Know About Gas Explosion in San Francisco, ABC 7
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://abc7news.com/what-we-know-about-gasexplosion-in-san-francisco/5125028/ [https://perma.cc/FT3X-MYY4].
26
Janie Har, San Francisco Gas Explosion Shoots Fire that Burns 5 Buildings,
USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/02/06/
san-francisco-gas-line-explosion-buildings-fire/2796109002/
[https://perma.cc/GD7Q-5FFL].
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when a “a gas service line was struck during a horizontal boring
operation.” 27 The explosion killed two people. 28
The severe consequences a natural gas pipeline attack could
have on life, property, the economy, and the environment combined
with the volatility of the product makes pipelines highly attractive
targets for those with malicious intent.29 Adversaries can capitalize
on the devastation natural gas naturally causes to threaten critical
infrastructure and human life through a cyberattack on the pipelines
that transport natural gas. 30 The technology used to operate and
control natural gas pipelines serves as an entrance to those that seek
to cause serious harm.
III.
CYBER THREATS TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
According to the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation’s president and CEO, “the threat of [a] cyberattack is at
an all-time high.” 31 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
has similarly reported that over the past several years, the energy
sector has “incurred more cybersecurity incidents than any other
sector.” 32 Moreover, DOE reported that the “frequency, scale, and
sophistication of cyber threats have increased, and attacks have
become easier to launch.” 33 As natural gas pipelines have
increasingly relied on computerized systems, adversaries may wish

27
Josh Chaplin, Durham Fire Department Releases Findings in Report on
Deadly Downton Gas Explosion, ABC EYEWITNESS NEWS 11 (Aug. 10, 2019),
https://abc11.com/durham-fire-dept-releases-findings-in-report-on-deadly-gasexplosion/5456021/ [https://perma.cc/M7X4-3E9F].
28
Id.
29
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5.
30
See PIPELINE SECURITY: HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 116TH CONGRESS
1 (2019); Physical Security, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASS’N OF AMERICA,
https://www.ingaa.org/Pipelines101/Security/26508.aspx (last visited Nov. 30,
2019) [https://perma.cc/XTF3-5K2L].
31
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5.
32
Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, Terrorism and Oil & Gas Pipeline
Infrastructure: Vulnerability and Potential Liability for Cybersecurity Attacks, 2
OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. & ENERGY J. 579, 581 (2017).
33
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 11–12.
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to utilize pipelines to launch attacks with devastating
consequences. 34
While the U.S. has not yet experienced a cyberattack that
resulted in death or a catastrophic disruption in the flow of oil or
gas, cyberattacks on natural gas pipelines can result in significant
physical damage such as “explosions, spills, or fires, which will
easily threaten human life, property and the environment.” 35
Cyberattacks can also lead to electricity production outages. 36
Foreign cyberattacks on energy infrastructure show how serious
energy cyberattacks can be.
As the U.S. increases reliance on natural gas, the impact of a
cyberattack on critical energy infrastructure is exacerbated. 37 The
interdependency between natural gas pipelines and the electric grid
has steadily increased. As a result, it is important to understand the
threats to America’s electric grid to recognize the risks natural gas
pipelines face.
A. Ukraine’s Electric Grid Cyberattack
In a display of the effectiveness of an energy infrastructure
cyberattack, Ukrainian power companies experienced unscheduled
power outages, affecting 225,000 local customers in December

Physical Security, supra note 30; see HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE
116TH CONGRESS, supra note 30; see Hillary Hellmann, Comment,
Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United States Pipeline SCADA Systems, 36
ENERGY L.J. 157, 159 (2015). Liquid and gas transmission pipelines utilize
SCADA technology to “control thousands of miles of pipelines from one central
location. Human controllers can input commands to remotely operate pipeline
control equipment” to control such components as pressure, temperature, and
rate of oil or gas flow. Id.
35
Clifford Krauss, Cyberattack Shows Vulnerability of Gas Pipeline Network,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/business/
energy-environment/pipeline-cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/S8MK-RT7G].
36
Id.
37
Elisabeth Buchwald, The Use of Natural Gas Exposes U.S. to Cyber Attacks,
FERC Chairman Says, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/increased-use-of-natural-gas-exposes-usto-cyber-attacks-ferc-chairman-says-2019-02-14 [https://perma.cc/8VPL4QEV].
34
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2015. 38 The power outages were determined to be the result of an
external cyberattack. 39 DHS released a formal report detailing the
attack, which stated that the attackers remotely targeted three
regional electric power distribution companies and by “leveraging
legitimate credentials obtained via unknown means, remotely
operated breakers to disconnect power” and “wiped some systems
by executing the KillDisk malware at the conclusion of the
cyberattack.” 40
The cyber-attackers utilized known methods of cyber intrusions
and techniques that had not before been used in a cyberattack. 41 The
initial intrusion came from spear-phising, whereby an attack
originates in a business system and “migrate[s] to operations
systems.” 42 Attackers sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office
documents that contained the malware used to gain access to the
electricity company’s networks. 43 This enabled the attackers to the
steal credentials necessary to access the company’s network
allowing the attackers to issue commands remotely in order to
schedule service outages. 44 The attackers were also able to access
telephone systems in order to generate an overload of calls to the
energy company denying access to customers attempting to report
outages. 45

ROBERT M. LEE ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER ATTACK ON THE UKRAINIAN
POWER GRID v (Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center 2016); ICS
Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical
Infrastructure, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.uscert.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 [hereinafter ICS Alert]
[https://perma.cc/6GDA-7GAC].
39
ICS Alert, supra note 38.
40
NCCIS/ICS-CERT INCIDENT ALERT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 7,
2016).
41
Id.
42
Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 13. Spear-phishing
is sending a recipient official-looking emails that contain malware (harmful
software programs) that will insert into a computer system and allow the sender
to gain access to business information and confidential data. Id.
43
NCCIS/ICS-CERT INCIDENT ALERT, supra note 40; LEE ET AL., supra note
38, at 1.
44
See LEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2.
45
See id.
38

226

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 217

The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center noted
that the attacker’s strongest capability was not the complexity of
their cyberattack on Ukraine, but rather the attacker’s ability to
“perform long-term [surveillance] operations required to learn the
environment and execute a highly synchronized, multistage,
multisite attack.” 46 The Ukrainian cyberattack took place
immediately after “a political revolution in Kiev, the annexation of
Crimea, and amid military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and
Luhansk regions.” 47 The U.S. government and cybersecurity firms
attributed the Ukraine cyberattack to Russia as an act of cyber
warfare. 48 While the Ukraine cyberattack was on the electric grid
generally, it demonstrated “one nation’s ability to disrupt another by
shutting down operations and damaging physical equipment.” 49
The techniques demonstrated by Russia are transferable to
natural gas pipelines. In fact, a Russian group, Black Ghost
Knifefish,” has targeted U.S. natural gas and highlights the growing
concern of cyber warfare on energy infrastructure. 50
B. Energy Infrastructure Cyberattacks Have Morphed into Cyber
Warfare
Today, nations can “cause warlike damage to their enemy’s vital
infrastructure without launching a military strike.” 51 In Ukraine,
Russian intrusion into their electric grid resulted in power outages
46

See id.
Donghui Park et al., Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the
Ukrainian Power Grid Attacks, U. OF WASH. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://jsis.washington.edu/news/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-russiaukrainian-power-grid-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/5SFW-Q48Z].
48
Id.
49
Jean-Marc Ollagnier, Cyberattacks are Becoming a Greater Challenge for the
Energy Industry, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jeanmarcollagnier/2018/10/01/the-next-cyberattack-staying-ahead-of-hackers-isbecoming-a-greater-challenge/#400a63bf4f0f [https://perma.cc/RZQ9-PHY6].
50
Id.
51
Beatrice Christofaro, Cyberattacks are the Newest Frontier of War and Can
Strike Harder than a Natural Disaster. Here’s Why the US Could Struggle to
Cope if it Got Hit, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.
com/cyber-attack-us-struggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4
[https://perma.cc/98YH-5AC5].
47
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for a quarter of a million people. 52 A shut down of the electric grid
does not just result in darkness. Rather, phones and the internet do
not work, transportation idles because fuel is inaccessible and
charging stations are inoperable. 53 The same rings true for banks,
ATMs, heating and air conditioning, which would not work.54
Hospitals and emergency services would similarly not be
available. 55
While nearly everyone in the U.S. has experienced an electric
outage from accidents or storms, the potential blackout that could
come from an energy infrastructure cyberattack is unprecedented.
Unlike a cyberattack, when a major natural disaster, like a hurricane,
knocks out power, the U.S. can be reasonably certain when the
hurricane will end. Further, hurricanes do not “return to strike a
second or third time” and do not “replicate themselves in other parts
of the country.” 56 Connecticut’s chief cybersecurity risk officer,
Arthur House, predicted that within two weeks of a cyberattack
caused power outage, the U.S. “might exhaust reserve fuel to
generate utility services,” “[p]ublic order would be strained,” and
“[t]he hit on commerce could be devastating.” 57
The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(“DARPA”) is conducting projects to determine U.S. capabilities to
recover from a cyberattack that caused power outages like that in
Ukraine. 58 On the restrictive and secretive Plum Island, normally
used to conduct research on infectious diseases, DARPA ran a
program that simulated power grid deactivation that could ensue
LEE ET AL., supra note 38, at iv.
John E. Shkor & Timothy Connors, Escalation of Cyber Warfare Puts US
Electric Grid in Crosshairs, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2019/08/06/escalation_of_cyber_warfa
re_puts_us_electric_grid_in_crosshairs_111252.html [https://perma.cc/28LGWF6C].
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Arthur H. House, We’d be Crippled by a Cyberattack on our Utilities, WASH.
POST (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/wed-becrippled-by-a-cyberattack-on-our-utilities/2018/10/14/206b0dc6-cca8-11e8a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html [https://perma.cc/HM8W-MSV9].
57
Id.
58
Christofaro, supra note 51.
52
53
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from an energy infrastructure cyberattack. 59 DARPA’s program
director, Walter Weiss, described the process of bringing the grid
back from deactivation as “painstaking” and “slow.” 60
The federal government has taken steps to increase U.S. energy
infrastructure cybersecurity. Executive Order 13800 called for an
assessment of the detrimental effects that a prolonged power outage
from a cyberattack would have on the country as well as gaps and
vulnerabilities in America’s preparedness for an energy
infrastructure cyberattack. 61 It appears, however, that America’s
focus on energy cybersecurity stops short of natural gas pipelines.
Though the threat to natural gas pipeline cybersecurity is prevalent,
acknowledged, and increasingly serious, cybersecurity for natural
gas pipelines is not yet prioritized.
CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
While the above cyberattacks were on the electric gird and
not specifically natural gas pipelines, the interdependency between
natural gas pipelines and the electric grid is steadily increasing. 62
Thus the cyber vulnerabilities of natural gas pipelines are important
in their own right and even more so because of the effect that the
vulnerabilities have on the electric power sector as a whole. 63 DOE
reported in 2017 that the electric sector is increasingly reliant on
gas-fired energy: in 2005 natural gas accounted for 9% of the United
States’ electricity generation, grew to 30% by 2013, and reached
IV.

59

Id.
Id. While trial runs of worst-case scenario reboots have worked, Weiss has
expressed serious concern over how “fragile and prone to disruption” a recovery
effort might be. Id.
61
Exec. Order No. 13800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22, 391 (2017).
62
Mark Tarallo, Is Pipeline Security Adequate?, ASIS INT’L (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2019/10/ispipeline-security-adequate/ [https://perma.cc/D2WT-RP4V].
63
Id.
60
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42% by 2016. 64 As natural gas has “become a major part of the fuel
mix” the urgency of pipeline cybersecurity threats has increased. 65
A. Methods of Cyberattacks on Natural Gas Pipelines
Natural gas pipelines have moved to computerized systems,
which are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Most pipelines use the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) systems. 66
SCADA collects real-time data to provide the pipeline operator with
“feedback and information about the entire pipeline system and
triggers safety alarms when operating conditions are not within the
prescribed design parameters.” 67 In turn, operators can remotely
send commands to control the variables measured and reported by
SCADA. 68
While SCADA is useful to pipelines in that they can reduce
operating costs and increase system efficiency, SCADA can cause
destruction even without an outside adversary. 69 For example, the
San Bruno pipeline explosion, which killed eight people, injured
fifty-eight others, and destroyed thirty-eight homes was a result of
“erroneous and unavailable SCADA pressure readings.” 70 Natural
gas pipeline explosions resulting from faulty SCADA readings and
signals also occurred in Bellingham, Washington and Texas City,
Meg Handley, Is the U.S. Too Dependent on Natural Gas for Electricity?,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/03/28/
is-the-us-too-dependent-on-natural-gas-for-electricity [https://perma.cc/6LYX2WC3]; Natural Gas Generators Make Up the Largest Share of Overall U.S.
Generation Capacity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34172
[https://perma.cc/RR9H-NYAZ].
65
Tarallo, supra note 62.
66
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 584.
67
Id. at 585. SCADA monitors and provides information such as the pipeline
pressures, temperatures, tank levels, and pump seeds. Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 586. The pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington resulted from
the faulty of the SCADA system and caused spillage of 237,000 gallons of
gasoline into a creek, which ignited. The explosion killed and injured a number
of people and caused $45 million in damage. The Texas City explosion was
caused by faulty SCADA signals and also resulted in a number of death and
significant injuries. Id.
64

230

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 217

Texas, both of which resulted in loss of life. 71 SCADA is also
becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks that could
increase these deadly accidents. 72
The Congressional Research Service states “cyber infiltration of
[SCADA] could allow successful ‘hackers’ to disrupt pipeline
services and cause spills, explosions, or fires – all from remote
locations via the Internet or other communication pathways.” 73 In
other words, adversaries could capitalize on the damage SCADA is
already capable of executing and manipulate the system to result in
more death and destruction. 74
There are a variety of other methods that an adversary could use
to threaten the cybersecurity of a natural gas pipeline. 75 For example,
attackers can infiltrate an organization’s operation systems through
a communication pathway such as the internet to “disrupt its service
and cause spills, releases, explosions, or fires.” 76 Another potential
avenue to conduct a cyberattack is through spear-phishing. 77
Adversaries can also access and infiltrate the control valves,
pressure monitors, and other equipment that are connected to
wireless networks, which are vital to the pipelines functioning. 78
B. Examples of Natural Gas Pipeline Attacks
While the U.S. has not experienced a cyberattack that has caused
physical damage to natural gas pipelines, foreign pipelines have
71

Id.
See id. at 585.
73
PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42660, PIPELINE
CYBERSECURITY: FEDERAL POLICY ii (2012).
74
See id.
75
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 13.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See Krauss, supra note 35; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
5, at 12. Cyberattacks are not limited to gas disruption or explosion, but instead
cyberattacks can allow an adversary to access confidential customer and
business data such as “holdings, trading strategies and exploration and
production technologies.” A hacker can also issue fake transactions and
potentially “jumble gas shipments.” A cyberattack can also result in operation
disruptions, modification or destruction or private information, and be an overall
threat to national security. Id.
72
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been damaged at the hands of cyberattackers. For example, in 1982
the Trans-Siberian pipeline, which runs over much of Russia,
experienced a significant explosion. 79 A “malicious code” in the
pipeline control software caused the explosion by increasing the
pipeline pressure. 80 The explosion equaled that of a nuclear
weapon. 81
In 2008, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which spans from
the Caspian Sea to the Turkish Mediterranean coast and is outfitted
with “sensors and cameras to monitor every inch of the line”
exploded without triggering any alarms or cameras. 82 The mystery
source of the explosion turned out to be a “sophisticated cyberattack
on the pipeline’s control system.” 83 Though the source of the attack
is not definitively known, attackers tied to the Russian government
were able to access the pipeline computer system through the
surveillance cameras and cost billions of dollars in lost tariffs and
export revenue. 84 While the exact capabilities of the attackers are
also not known, the pipeline had just installed new cameras that
possessed communication software vulnerable to attacks. 85 It was
reported that the vulnerabilities were exploited and the attackers
gained entry onto the network through the computers. 86 The
attackers were also said to have intruded into the alarm server
through a Windows operating system containing malicious
software. 87
Cyberattacks on U.S. natural gas pipelines are not just a
possibility, but America’s natural gas pipelines have already
experienced a number of cyberattacks. For example, DHS and FBI
have found that Russia has already “infiltrated the U.S. electric grid,
embed[ded] malware that could incapacitate power plants,
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 587.
Id.
81
Id. at 588.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Robert M. Lee et al., Media report of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
Cyber Attack, INDUS. CONTROL SYS. 3 (Dec. 20, 2014); Dancy & Dancy, supra
note 32, at 588–89.
85
Lee et al., supra note 84, at 3–4.
86
Id. at 4.
87
Id.
79
80
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pipelines, and water supplies, and . . . ha[s] even gained access to
power plant control rooms.” 88 In 2012, specifically, Industrial
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team identified a
number of cyber intrusions that targeted natural gas pipelines, which
were traced back to a “single campaign with spear-phishing
activity.” 89 In 2018, a cyberattack in Houston, Texas did not disrupt
gas service but “forced four of the nation’s natural-gas pipeline
operators to temporarily shut down computer communications with
their customers.” 90 More recently in 2019, a firewall was “exploited”
at a western U.S. utility, which caused devices to reboot and
communication disruptions. 91
C. Natural Gas Pipelines Cyber Warfare
In response to these attacks and even larger vulnerabilities, the
U.S. is taking actions that “are potential game changers in the global
escalation of cyber warfare.” 92 The U.S. is on “cyberwar footing”
with Iran’s military command and control networks and Russia’s
electric grid. 93 For example, the U.S. has imbedded computer codes
that are “the digital equivalent of bombs that could be detonated”
throughout Russia’s electric grid. 94 Moreover, in June 2019,
President Donald Trump ordered a cyberstrike against the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps that disabled Iranian computer systems
that were posed to attack oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. 95
Shkor & Connors, supra note 53.
MONTHLY MONITOR, INDUS. CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE
TEAM 1 (2012).
90
Krauss, supra note 35.
91
HJ Mai, NERC Finds First Remote Hacker Interference on US Grid from
Cyberattack, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
nerc-finds-first-remote-hacker-interference-on-us-grid-fromcyberattack/562478/ [https://perma.cc/6CQK-NCXJ].
92
Shkor & Connors, supra note 53.
93
Id.
94
Id.; see also E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on
Russia’s Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia-grid.html [https://perma.cc/C99QT6ZP].
95
Ellen Nakashima, Trump Approved Cyber-strikes Against Iranian Computer
Database Used to Plan Attacks on Oil Tankers, WASH. POST (June 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/with-trumps-approval88
89

MAR. 2020]

Your Natural Gas is Not Cyber-Secure

233

These are examples of offensive cyber warfare tactics and show
cyberattacks are now used as an active war tool and have been
formally weaponized. These offensive efforts also increase the
likelihood of a counterattack, exacerbating the need for the U.S. to
bolster energy infrastructure cybersecurity. 96 In 2008, the
Department of Defense sought to strengthen U.S. energy
cybersecurity through the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command. 97
Cyber Command’s job is to direct, synchronize, and coordinate
“cyberspace planning and operations in defense of the U.S. and its
interests.” 98 President Trump’s 2020 budget also requested $9.6
billion for cyber defense and offensive operations through Cyber
Command. 99
Cyber Command is a reaction to the cyber-intrusions and
cyberattacks that threaten America’s energy infrastructure.
America’s natural gas pipelines, however, remain vulnerable
because of a lack of any meaningful regulation or protection. 100
Natural gas pipelines’ main weakness is that the regulatory
framework that governs the infrastructure’s cybersecurity is
ineffective. TSA is the regulatory body that oversees natural gas
pipeline cybersecurity, but they have promulgated only voluntary
guidelines, which impose no actual requirements on natural gas
pipelines. 101
Though cyber-intrusions have not yet resulted in physical
damage or death, the current regulatory framework is not sufficient
to prevent against the growing threat of a cyberattack on natural gas
pipelines. TSA has no way to “ensure that its guidelines reflect the
pentagon-launched-cyber-strikes-against-iran/2019/06/22/250d3740-950d-11e9b570-6416efdc0803_story.html [https://perma.cc/554K-9DNY]; Shkor &
Connors, supra note 53.
96
Shkor & Connors, supra note 53.
97
History, U.S. CYBER COMMAND, https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MJQ7-CXBQ].
98
Id.
99
Aaron Boyd, Trump’s 2020 Budget Requests About $11 Billion for Cyber
Defense and Operations, NEXTGOV (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/
cybersecurity/2019/03/trumps-2020-budget-requests-about-11-billion-cyberdefense-and-operations/155445/ [https://perma.cc/W5C6-6FEE].
100
HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 116TH CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 2.
101
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 6.
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latest known standards and best practices for physical security and
cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment
that pipelines face.” 102
Cyber-threats evolve with technology to become more deadly
and destructive. As the threats evolve, cybersecurity regulations
need to rise to meet them, which current regulations are unable to
do. 103 TSA lacks the resources necessary to strengthen and enforce
mandatory guidelines making TSA unlikely to implement
mandatory regulations and similarly renders TSA the wrong agency
to promulgate mandatory regulations. Rather, DOE should
promulgate natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.
V.
CURRENT REGULATIONS OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
Over time, natural gas extraction, production, and mobility has
been regulated by a number of different agencies. 104 While local
governments originally regulated the natural gas markets, the
natural gas business possessed many of the characteristics of a
natural monopoly, making it a prime product for federal
regulation. 105 In other words, one “distribution network could
deliver natural gas more cheaply than two companies with overlying
distribution networks and markets.” 106 Further, the natural gas
industry was “clothed in the public interest” in that people needed
access to cheap, reliable natural gas. 107
In exchange for the ability to operate as a monopoly, natural gas
had to accept heavy regulation to prevent the industry from taking
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5.
See id.
104
The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://naturalgas.org/regulation/history/ [https://perma.cc/8GEW-ZDZM].
105
See id. Electricity is a prominent example of a natural monopoly whereby it
is considered cheaper and more efficient for a single company to deliver natural
gas than two companies. A natural monopoly grants total control over the
market, without competition, which leaves the monopoly in a prime spot to take
advantage of its position. To prevent a monopoly from abusing its market
power, rates are regulated by governments. Regulation requires that “just and
reasonable” rates are set so as to not take advantage of consumers. Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.; see KARL MCDERMOTT, COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE
INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 4 (2012).
102
103
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advantage of its exclusive position, known as the regulatory
compact. 108 Today, a number of different agencies regulate the
various aspects of natural gas. TSA, housed within DHS, oversees
natural gas pipeline security. 109 The Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), a sub-agency of the
Department of Transportation (“DOT”), as well as DOE play a role
in response and recovery if a natural gas pipeline cybersecurity
incident or intrusion occurs. 110
A. Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Markets
Local regulation was effective during the early days of natural
gas. 111 By the early 1900s, however, local regulation became more
difficult as natural gas was distributed between municipalities and
local governments no longer oversaw the entire natural gas
distribution chain. 112 State governments intervened and began to
regulate natural gas distribution through public utility commissions
and public service commissions. 113
Technology, however, developed to allow natural gas to be
transported between states. 114 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
“Commerce Clause Cases” held that state regulation of natural gas
pipelines violated the interstate commerce clause. 115 As a result of
the decision, state governments could no longer regulate interstate
pipelines but, at the time of the decision, no federal legislation
addressed interstate pipelines. 116
Congress responded to this gap with the passage of the Natural
Gas Act (“NGA”) of 1938. 117 Finally, the federal government,
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 107.
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 598.
110
See TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN.: PIPELINE SECURITY AND INCIDENT
RECOVERY PROTOCOL PLAN 1 (2010).
111
The History of Regulation, supra note 104.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (a) (2012);
Natural Gas Act of 1938, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
108
109
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through the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) could directly
regulate interstate natural gas. 118 FPC also had the authority to
approve any new interstate pipelines. 119 In 1954, because of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 120,
wellhead prices were also brought under FPC regulation, granting
FPC more control over natural gas pipelines. 121
While the NGA filled a regulatory gap, the Act was disastrous
for America’s natural gas market and resulted in a 1978 natural gas
shortage. 122 In response, FPC was reorganized into the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and Congress enacted
the Natural Gas Policy Act to create a “single national natural gas
market” regulated under FERC. 123
Today, FERC is the main authority in natural gas pipeline
market regulation. 124 However, FERC plays no role in natural gas
https://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ngact
1938.html [https://perma.cc/2PHY-LB3M].
118
Natural Gas Act of 1938, supra note 117.
119
Id.
120
Philips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
121
The History of Regulation, supra note 104. Wellhead prices were unregulated
after the Natural Gas Act because the Act did not institute regulatory sales of
natural gas from producers to pipelines. Wellhead prices are “the rate at which
producers [sell] natural gas into the interstate market[.]” Id.
122
Id. FPC initially set rates based on cost of production but this became a heavy
administrative burden on the FPC due to the large number of different natural
gas producers. FPC moved to set rates on an individual basis whereby rates were
set on each producer’s cost of service. Again, administratively burdensome,
even impossible and resulted in enormous backlog. As a result, FPC moved to
set rates based on geographic areas by dividing the U.S. into five producing
regions where rates were set with interim ceiling prices. Again, became
infeasible and FPC adopted national price ceilings. These different pricing
systems were disastrous for the America’s natural gas market and only the
producing states had access to natural gas while consuming states experienced
natural gas shortages. Id.
123
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 207(a)(3) (2012); The History of
Regulation, supra note 104; History of FERC, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp (last visited Nov. 30,
2019) [https://perma.cc/UGP5-2CN5].
124
See Natural Gas Pipelines, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (Aug.
2015), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/pipelines.asp
[https://perma.cc/T5HT-7K9E].
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pipeline safety or security. 125 Rather, FERC works with other
agencies that oversee various aspects of natural gas pipeline safety
and security. 126
B. Natural Gas Pipeline Security Oversight: TSA
The primary agency charged with natural gas pipeline security
responsibilities is TSA. 127 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA to
oversee the security of all modes of transportation under DOT. 128 A
year later, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred TSA from
DOT to DHS where it remains today. 129
To comply with their security responsibilities, TSA maintains
the Pipeline Security Division, which “works to develop security
measures to mitigate risk, monitor compliance with security
guidelines, and build and maintain stakeholder relations.” 130 TSA
also possesses the authority to issue physical and cybersecurity
regulations for natural gas pipelines. 131 However, the agency has
declined to issue new rules or regulations to address natural gas
pipeline security since 9/11. 132 In reality, no bright line regulations
have ever been issued by TSA. 133 Instead, TSA has issued a series
of guidelines—specifically the Pipeline Security Guidelines—
which were updated in 2018 for the first time since 2011. 134

125

Id.
Id.
127
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 598.
128
Aviation and Transportation Security Administration Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(d)(2) (2001).
129
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 203 (2) (2012); Dancy & Dancy,
supra note 32, at 598.
130
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 110, at 5.
131
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 598.
132
Troutman Sanders Pipeline Practice, Pipeline Security and Cybersecurity:
Are Guidelines Enough to Protect Critical Infrastructure?, TROUTMAN
SANDERS (June 4, 2018), https://www.pipelaws.com/2018/06/pipeline-securitycybersecurity-guidelines-enough-protect-critical-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/CM7C-48J7].
133
See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 598.
134
PIPELINE SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 1.
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The Pipeline Security Guidelines lay out a “Corporate Security
Program” and encourage pipeline operators to establish and
implement the program. 135 The program’s key recommendations are
to develop a corporate security plan, which should identify who will
execute the plan, document the company’s security policies in
reference to other companies’ policies, and be reviewed on an
annual basis as well as provided to TSA for review. 136
The Pipeline Security Guidelines also promulgate
recommendations for natural gas pipeline cybersecurity measures
based off of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”)’s “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity.” 137 NIST’s framework sets “standards and best
practices to assist organizations in managing cybersecurity risks”
and “promote the protection of critical infrastructure.” 138 TSA’s
Pipeline Security Guidelines recommend that organizations follow
NIST’s cybersecurity framework and list a number of industry and
federal government entities for pipeline operators to consult as a
reference for cybersecurity programs. 139
TSA’s guidelines, however thorough, are simply advisory. 140
The guidelines encourage the natural gas industry to implement the
suggested security measures, but again, implementation is only
encouraged, not mandated. 141 Specifically, the guidelines state that
they, “[do] not impose requirements on any person or company.” 142
These voluntary standards essentially leave the industry selfregulated. 143

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–4.
137
Id. at 16. NIST is not a Federal agency but an independent scientific entity
and thus does not possess any regulatory authority. Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 21.
140
Troutman Sanders Pipeline Practice, supra note 132.
141
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 6, at 2.
142
Id. at 1.
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Troutman Sanders Pipeline Practice, supra note 132.
135
136

MAR. 2020]

Your Natural Gas is Not Cyber-Secure

239

C. Other Agencies that Play a Role in Natural Gas Pipeline
Security
While TSA is the current entity set to oversee natural gas
pipeline safety and security, its means for incident response and
recovery are scant. 144 As a result, other agencies must play a role in
natural gas pipeline safety and security. 145 In 2010, TSA issued a
“Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan,” which
detailed the roles different federal agencies play in the case of a
security incident. 146
As the energy specific agency, DOE plays a significant role in
pipeline security response as the agency is “responsible for
coordinating all activities related to energy infrastructure
protection.” 147 DOE is also responsible for the facilitation of
assessments, reports, and restoration of “damaged energy systems
and components.” 148 During a natural gas pipeline emergency, DOE
would coordinate with other federal agencies and the private sector
to assess the supply of natural gas. 149
TSA Assistant Secretary or Secretary of Homeland Security is
also an active participant in the event of a pipeline security threat or
incident. Either Secretary may deploy Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (“VIPR”) teams that work with local
security and law enforcement and provide supplemental security. 150

See TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 110, at 1.
See Tarallo, supra note 62.
146
See TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 110, at 1.
147
Id. at 7.
148
Id. This responsibility is carried out by the Office of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability and the responsibility is specifically called Emergency
Support Function (“ESF”) 12. ESF12 is outlined by the National Response
Framework, which is consistent with the Pipeline Security and Incident
Recovery Protocol Plan. Id.
149
See id.
150
Id. at 6. “VIPR teams are comprised of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs),
Federal Security Directors (FSDs), Surface Transportation Security Inspectors
(STSIs), Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Behavior Detection Officers,
and Explosives Detection Canine teams.” Id.
144
145

240

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 217

VIPR teams also provide pipeline companies “pre-incident
deterrence measures” after a threat has been detected. 151
The final key agency in natural gas pipeline security is PHMSA.
Within PHMSA lies the Office of Pipeline Safety, which is
responsible for ensuring the “safe, reliable, and environmentally
sound operations of our nation’s pipeline transportation system.” 152
PHMSA oversees interstate pipelines once a project is operating
through monitored compliance which ensures pipelines operate
safely and securely. 153
PHMSA seeks compliance with pipeline safety standards
through pipeline inspections and investigation of safety incidents. 154
PHMSA can also provide assistance during response or recovery of
a pipeline security incident through its Regional Emergency
Transportation Coordinator. 155 DOT can also issue special permits,
safety orders, and corrective action orders in response to incidents. 156
Other agencies can provide support in different capacities in the
event of a natural gas pipeline security incident. Federal Emergency
Management Agency, can provide support and planning during an
incident. 157 The Office of Infrastructure Protection within DHS
coordinates efforts to reduce risk from terrorist activities. 158 The
National Transportation Safety Board investigates pipeline
Id. VIRP teams also provide “post-incident site security” if the “pre-incident
deterrence measures” is not effective in preventing a detected threat. Id.
152
Safety Awareness Overview, PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMIN. (June 11, 2019), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/safety-awareness/
pipeline/safety-awareness-overview [https://perma.cc/SE7D-YFFX].
153
Jacquelyn Pless, Making State Gas Pipelines Safe and Reliable: An
Assessment of State Policy, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar.
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/making-state-gas-pipelines-safeand-reliable.aspx [https://perma.cc/7EJT-N6RA].
154
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 110, at 6.
155
Id. at 7. “Each RETCO manages regional DOT emergency preparedness and
response activities in the assigned region on behalf of the Secretary of
Transportation. RETCOs are responsible for coordinating with, and providing
assistance to, other Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal governments.”
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 8–9.
158
Id.
151
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transportation accidents unless the event becomes categorized as a
criminal act, at which point the FBI would become involved. 159
The above agencies all play a role in a natural gas pipeline
cybersecurity incident or attack. 160 However, there is no concrete
plan in place to ensure an attack does not occur, just general
guidelines promulgated in the hopes the industry will rise to the
standard. While a meticulous system with a detailed understanding
of how to respond to an attack is undoubtedly useful and important,
focus should be directed at preventing cyberattacks from occurring.
VI.

NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CYBERSECURITY REGULATIONS
SHOULD BE MANDATORY
In the United States, cyberattacks and impending cyber warfare
on natural gas pipelines are a legitimate concern exacerbated by the
federal government’s ineffective oversight. 161 Despite pushes by
policy makers to make the cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines a
national security issue, security regulations currently remain
voluntary guidelines. 162 The private sector, however, has advocated
to keep natural gas pipeline cybersecurity standards voluntary. 163
A. The Private Sector’s Argument that Regulation Should Remain
Voluntary
The private sector has argued that natural gas pipeline
cybersecurity standards should remain voluntary and would prefer
cybersecurity be regulated in a “risk-based approach augmented by
public-private partnerships.” 164 The private sector has four core
arguments as to why mandatory regulations should not be enacted:
(1) prescriptive regulations would “increase business expenses and
overhead[;]” (2) companies would be forced to comply with
measures that rapidly become “out-of-date and ineffective[;]” (3)
Id. at 9.
Id.
161
See Christofaro, supra note 51.
162
Tarallo, supra note 62.
163
Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A
Proactive Approach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations are Effective,
14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 345, 357 (2016).
164
Id. at 356–57.
159
160
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the already functional public-private partnership to address
cybersecurity would be disincentivized; and (4) stricter “regulations
would not necessarily improve cybersecurity.” 165
Specifically, natural gas pipeline trade organizations like the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (“INGAA”) believe
that “effective collaboration,” achieved through guidance rather
than enforced regulations, is foundational to the security of natural
gas pipelines. 166 INGAA claims that “[r]eal-time, actionable
information is vital to ensure [that] pipeline operators are equipped
with the latest intelligence on threats,” which the pipeline industry
already maintains through a network of information sharing. 167
INGAA further argues that mandatory regulations will corrode the
effective relationship already in place between information sharing
facilities and the oil and gas industry, TSA, and DHS. 168
Other proponents of voluntary regulation, such as Dan Coats, the
Director of National Intelligence, further argue mandatory
regulations inhibit the flexibility that is required for the industry to
“adapt and update protocols” in responses to cyberattacks. 169
Specifically, “[e]xperience shows that mandatory standards often
are outdated almost as soon as they are introduced.” 170 Rather than
mandatory regulations, there should be “baseline practices” on
which the industry can build “in a way that matches the nimbleness
of [] adversaries.” 171
Voluntary guidelines are not unique to natural gas pipelines. 172
Other “privately held critical infrastructure,” such as banks and
telecommunications carriers, that would likely be targeted by a
Id. at 357.
Don Santa, Congress should support efforts to further protect pipelines from
cyber threats, THE HILL (Feb. 28, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/
cybersecurity/432024-congress-should-support-efforts-to-further-protectpipelines-from-cyber [https://perma.cc/LX7D-DWQ6].
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1506
(2013).
165
166

MAR. 2020]

Your Natural Gas is Not Cyber-Secure

243

“large-scale cyber-attack” are left to private regulation. 173 Legal
scholars have observed that the U.S. “follows a ‘bifurcated approach
to network security’ that ‘relie[s] predominately on private
investment in prevention and public investment in prosecution.’” 174
In other words, for much of America’s critical infrastructure, the
government does not impose mandatory regulations and the
companies are left alone to protect themselves, including their
cyber-networks. 175
These arguments are combatted by a recent trend that “regular
firms that operate in a competitive market (such as online retailers)
may be adequately protecting their systems against ordinary
intruders” whereas “strategically significant firms in uncompetitive
markets (such as power companies and other public utilities) seem
less likely to maintain defenses capable of protecting their systems
against skilled and determined adversaries (such as foreign
intelligence services).” 176 As a result, while some members of the
private industry may be equipped to handle the cyber-threats posed
to firms in regulated markets, the private industry has not adequately
protected natural gas pipelines.
Even more notably, cyber-security is often overlooked by
private industry when left to regulate itself. 177 Rather, the cybersecurity field is “primarily concerned with negative externalities.
Just as firms tend to underinvest in pollution controls because some
costs of their emissions are borne by those who are downwind, they
also tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because some costs of
intrusions are externalized onto others.” 178 The full cost of a
cyberattack is not borne by the energy company, but is instead borne
by the public at large who relies on the granted monopoly industry
for an essential service, de-incentivizing energy companies to invest
in the required defense mechanisms absent some mandatory
regulation. 179
173
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B. Argument that Natural Gas Pipeline Regulations Should Be
Mandatory
Self-regulation may be sufficient for other private industries, but
natural gas’ unique situation requires mandatory regulation to
defend against pipeline cyberattacks. FERC Commissioner, Richard
Glick, has spoken out about the weakness of these voluntary
guidelines and states, “[i]f you just have one weak link—one entity
that does not follow voluntary standards—it can cause significant
damages.” 180 Unfortunately, “America’s interest in protecting our
critical infrastructure from national security threats is in tension with
America’s interest in allowing the private sector to provide many
essential services in critical infrastructure sectors.” 181 However,
with the U.S. openly engaged in “offensive cyber intrusions” against
foreign nations, it is imperative to recognize and address the
weaknesses in U.S energy cybersecurity. 182
It is an anomaly that the cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines
has been left to market forces and voluntary action. 183 After 9/11 the
U.S. government moved from deregulation and privatization
towards tightened regulations to strengthen homeland security. 184 It
is difficult to leave national defense and homeland security to
market influences. 185
National defense and homeland security are public goods where
individuals share in the benefits irrespective of how much they spend [if
at all]. Markets are inefficient at supplying goods and services in
situations where groups of people must work together to achieve a good
outcome but the incentive for investment and cooperation is low. In these
situations, the private sector will not produce an optimal outcome. 186

The private sector controls a majority (85%) of “cyber relevant
critical infrastructure in the U.S.” and while the private sector has a
great interest in protecting that infrastructure from cyberthreats,
Troutman Sanders Pipeline Practice, supra note 132.
Laughlin, supra note 163, at 351.
182
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those “may not align exactly with the interests of the government or
the public.” 187 For example, specific individual companies may not
believe they will be the target of a foreign cyberterrorist act. 188 As a
result, that individual company may calculate that it is not in its best
interest to protect against a hypothetical, seemingly unlikely
attack. 189 The government may see it in the opposite light in that an
unsuspecting utility is the exact target for an adversary. 190
These interests are further exemplified when private businesses
employ cost-benefit analyses. 191 If the cost to protect a company
from a cyberattack is outweighed by the cost of recovery after an
attack, the company is unlikely to employ the security measure. 192
Companies are further discouraged from investing in security
measures because the company does not fully “internalize the
negative and positive externalities of a successful cyberattack.” 193
For example, a company will internalize the cost of new computers,
new infrastructure, and lost revenue in the wake of a cyberattack but
the government will assist in finding the culprit and get the
computers operational. 194
In other industries, insurance has served as an implicit regulator,
and has been used as a “tool to ‘outsource’ public regulations” in
industries without full governmental regulation. 195 Insurance may
function as a form of private regulation, governing how
organizations handle risks. 196 As a result, insurance can prevent and
Laughlin, supra note 163, at 351.
Id. at 352.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 357.
192
Id.
193
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194
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Qihao He & Michael Faure, Regulation by Catastrophe Insurance: A
Comparative Study, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 190 (2019). This article does not
address how insurance can regulate the natural gas industry specifically but
rather discusses five insurance-based regulatory tools (“risk-based pricing,
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196
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mitigate losses associated with various risks such as external
catastrophes. 197 Regulation through insurance can also incentivize
organizations to protect themselves against disasters and
catastrophic risks. 198
Through techniques such as risked-based pricing, contract
design, loss prevention, claim management, and refusal to insure,
insurance can regulate potentially devastating events. 199 Insurance
has been an effective implicit regulator in some industries, such as
automobile, workplace, environmental, and medical liability. 200
Insurance has prevented environmental accidents, protected against
flood and hurricane damage and combated climate-related
extremes. 201 However effective in other industries, insurance has not
filled the regulatory gap of natural gas pipeline cybersecurity
because the insurance companies perceive the inadequate TSA
guidelines as “best industry practice.” 202
Ultimately, federal mandatory regulation is necessary and
inevitable. 203 The private industry is not able to regulate effectively
and insurance cannot act as an implicit regulator. 204 While energy
infrastructure has not yet experienced a deadly or severely
destructive event from a cybersecurity breach, the threat is very real
as has been demonstrated by a number of real-world examples. 205
Historical examples have shown that when the U.S. is attacked, the
nation responds with legislation. 206 However, instead of waiting for
Id. at 191.
He & Faure, supra note 195, at 197.
199
Id. at 201–07.
200
See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From
Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416–17
(2013).
201
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the inevitable attack, the U.S. should promulgate mandatory
regulations to prevent an attack on the country’s natural gas
pipelines.
VII.

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHOULD HAVE THE
ABILITY TO REGULATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
CYBERSECURITY
Updated and mandatory cybersecurity regulations for natural
gas pipelines have been advocated for by a number of groups. The
Government Accountability Office issued a report that accurately
described TSA’s guidelines as insufficient and, even though
reissued in 2018, outdated because a number of critical areas were
not revised. 207 TSA’s Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery
Protocol Plan has also not been updated since its issuance in 2010. 208
Further, TSA has no current plans to revise pipeline security threats,
such as cybersecurity threats. 209
A. TSA Should Not be the Agency to Promulgate Mandatory
Natural Gas Pipeline Cybersecurity Regulations
According to FERC Chairman, Neil Chatterjee, and FERC
Commissioner, Richard Glick, natural gas pipelines “must comply
with mandatory standards” to “protect against attacks that could
compromise electric service.” 210 The two FERC leaders, however,
do not advocate that TSA, the primary agency to oversee natural gas

Center bombings, and the “USA PATRIOT Act” was passed after the terrorist
attack of 9/11. Id.
207
See generally, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-426,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: KEY PIPELINE SECURITY DOCUMENTS
NEED TO REFLECT CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (2019). The GAO
found the guidelines did not revise in “three key areas; pipeline security threats,
[…] incident management policies, and DHS’s terrorism alert system.” Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Neil Chatterjee & Richard Glick, Cybersecurity threats to U.S. gas pipelines
call for stricter oversight, AXIOS (June 11, 2018), https://www.axios.com/
cybersecurity-threats-to-us-gas-pipelines-call-for-stricter-oversight-09fac6e5da94-491e-9523-d08ef15237f4.html [https://perma.cc/GL2D-S6FU].
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pipeline cybersecurity, should be the agency to implement
mandatory regulations. 211
Practically, TSA is not equipped to implement and enforce
mandatory regulations. 212 As of May 2017, TSA had a mere six fulltime employees in charge of security oversight for the millions of
miles of pipelines, equating to approximately 450,000 miles of
pipeline per employee. 213 Of these employees, none have “the
specialized computer system expertise needed to support more
extensive cybersecurity activities.” 214
TSA has not even kept up with the limited guidelines they have
implemented. To assess pipeline vulnerabilities, TSA is supposed to
conduct pipeline security reviews, known as Corporate Security
Reviews (“CSRs”) and Critical Facility Security Reviews. 215
However, TSA’s limited number of staff has prevented TSA from
conducting an appropriate amount of reviews. 216 In order to
effectively review the “top 100 critical pipeline systems,” a TSA
priority, TSA would need to conduct 46 CSRs. 217 However, in 2018
TSA officials stated that their goal was to conduct between 15-23
CSRs per year. 218 TSA has not risen to meet its stated goal as in 2012
and 2013, only 14 full reviews were conducted, and only one was
conducted in 2014. 219
B. The Department of Energy is the Appropriate Agency to
Promulgate Mandatory Natural Gas Pipeline Cybersecurity
Regulations
TSA is not equipped to implement and enforce mandatory
natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations. To oversee the
211
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security of all U.S. transportation is a tall order and TSA simply does
not have the resources devoted to protecting natural gas pipelines
from the cyberthreats they face. Congress, various federal agencies
and the executive branch have all indicated, however, that DOE is
the agency to implement stronger natural gas cybersecurity
measures. 220 DOE already plays an active role in pipeline security
and incident response and should move into the position of being
the primary preventative agency by implementing mandatory
regulations. 221
Congress has taken note of natural gas pipeline cybersecurity
threats. Fred Upton, a Representative from Michigan, stated “[w]e
know that Russian agents and other nation states are waging cyber
war on our energy infrastructure. It’s critical to address these
threats.” 222 Members of Congress from both the Democratic and
Republican parties have taken steps to tighten pipeline
cybersecurity, but Congress has not directed legislation towards
TSA. 223 It appears that Congressional advocates of stronger natural
gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations think DOE is best equipped
to promulgate cybersecurity rules as representatives have introduced
a number of bills that direct cybersecurity initiatives to DOE, not
TSA. 224
The Pipeline and Liquified Natural Gas Facility Cybersecurity
Preparedness Act (“H.R. 370”) is one of the most prominent bills in
See Rebecca Kern Looming Cybersecurity Battle: Who Protects U.S.
Pipelines?, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 22, 2018), https://news.bloomberg
environment.com/environment-and-energy/looming-cybersecurity-battle-whoprotects-us-pipelines-corrected [https://perma.cc/4Z99-VR98]; Sobczak, supra
note 7.
221
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 110, at 7.
222
Josh Paciorek, News: Upton Statement after Energy Subcommittee Passes
Bipartisan Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity Preparedness Act,
CONGRESSMAN FRED UPTON (May 16, 2019), https://upton.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=401201 [https://perma.cc/84Q3-MKX6].
223
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See generally Cyber Sense Act of 2019, H.R. 360, 116th Cong. (2019);
Energy Emergency Leadership Act, H.R. 362, 116th Cong. (2019); Enhancing
Grid Security through Public-Private Partnership Act, H.R. 359, 116th Cong.
(2019); Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, H.R. 370,
116th Cong. (2019). Id.
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the slew of pipeline cybersecurity legislation. Introduced by U.S.
Representative Fred Upton, H.R. 370 is a step towards tightening
energy infrastructure’s physical and cybersecurity guidelines by
requiring DOE to establish policies and procedures that would
ensure the security of natural gas pipelines. 225 H.R. 370 seeks to
ensure the “security, resiliency, and survivability of natural gas
pipelines” by establishing policies and procedures that coordinate
states, federal agencies, and the energy sector. 226
H.R. 370 calls for the development of “advanced cybersecurity
applications and technologies for natural gas pipelines.” 227 This
would include performing “pilot demonstration projects . . . with
representatives of the energy sector,” creating “workforce
development curricula,” and providing “technological tools to help
the energy sector voluntarily evaluate, prioritize, and improve
physical security and cybersecurity capabilities of natural gas
pipelines.” 228 While the Bill represents a step towards mandatory
regulation, it still leaves some regulatory efforts voluntary. 229 The
Bill calls for the development of advanced cybersecurity
applications and technology but only for voluntary use. 230 Similarly,
H.R. 370 aims to “provide technical tools to help the energy sector
voluntarily evaluate, prioritize, and improve physical security and
cybersecurity capabilities.” 231
Statutory interpretation would suggest that only those two
specific provisions are voluntary, while the remaining provisions are
mandatory. In drafting H.R. 370, Congress specifically noted which
provisions were voluntary by explicitly including the term
Pipeline and LNG Facility Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, H.R. 370, 116th
Cong. (2019). After being referred to the House’s Subcommittee on Energy,
H.R. 370 has last been ordered to be reported by voice vote. Fred Upton is
currently a Congressman from Michigan’s 6th District who served as Chairman
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce from 2010-2016. H.R. 370 also
includes security of hazardous liquid pipelines and liquefied natural gas
facilities. Id.
226
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227
Id.
228
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229
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230
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231
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“voluntary.” 232 As a result, it can be reasonably interpreted that in
the absence of the term “voluntary,” a provision is then mandatory.
H.R. 370 is surrounded by a host of other legislation from the
116th Congress concerning energy infrastructure’s physical and
cybersecurity, all directed at DOE. For example, H.R. 360, the
Cyber Sense Act of 2019, would require the Secretary of Energy to
“establish a voluntary Cyber Sense program to test the cybersecurity
of products and technologies intended for use in the bulk-power
system.” 233
Similarly, H.R. 362, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act,
would amend the Department of Energy Organization Act to assign
Assistant Secretaries new responsibilities in energy emergency
response. 234 Assistant DOE secretaries would possess energy
security functions such as “infrastructure, cybersecurity, emerging
threats, supply, and emergency planning, coordination, response,
and restoration. . .” 235
Furthermore, H.R. 359, the Enhancing Grid Security through
Public-Private Partnership Act, would require the Secretary of
Energy to submit to Congress a report that assesses, among other
things, “priorities, policies, procedures, and actions for enhancing
the physical security and cybersecurity of electricity distribution
systems to address threats to, and vulnerabilities of, such electricity
distribution systems.” 236 Like H.R. 370, H.R. 359 would require
some voluntary actions from DOE such as providing voluntary
implementation of electric grid utility cybersecurity assessments,
but other provisions do not state that they are voluntary. 237 Under
H.R. 359, some seemingly mandatory actions are to provide and
assist with cybersecurity risk training to electric utilities, increase
best practice sharing, and promote the cybersecurity of third-party
vendors. 238
232
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As described by Representative Upton and Energy and
Commerce Committee Republican leader, Representative Greg
Walden, “[t]hese bills reflect [the Energy and Commerce]
Committee’s commitment to strengthen energy delivery, security,
and reliability for Americans. We are advancing legislation to
bolster our protections against cybersecurity threats to energy
infrastructure, which is key to the Department of Energy’s
emergency preparedness and response capabilities.” 239 While these
pieces of proposed legislation do not direct DOE to promulgate
mandatory regulations, they are efforts to strengthen natural gas
pipeline and electric grid cybersecurity and vest responsibilities in
DOE.
FERC’s Chairman Chatterjee and Commissioner Glick, also
think DOE is the appropriate agency to implement mandatory
regulations. 240 “Congress should vest responsibility for pipeline
security with an agency that fully comprehends the energy sector
and has sufficient resources to address this growing threat.” 241 DOE
certainly understands the energy sector. Further, DOE is the
“Sector-Specific Agency for energy security” and has created an
office for cybersecurity. 242
The executive branch also appears to the think that DOE is the
agency to tighten natural gas pipeline cybersecurity. The Trump
Administration has announced that it is “establishing an office
within the [DOE] to shore up cybersecurity for critical infrastructure
like nuclear plants, refineries, and pipelines.” 243 Now within DOE
lies the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency
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Response, posed to “strengthen the DOE’s ability to play a vital role
protecting energy infrastructure from cyber threats . . . .” 244
DOE has also stepped up to play a more active role in
cybersecurity of the natural gas pipeline industry. DOE, not TSA is
leading a “consortium over concerns industrial control systems”
(private entities and key industries concerned with energy
infrastructure cybersecurity threats). 245 The consortium is working
together towards recommendations to increase natural gas pipeline
cybersecurity. 246
While the recommendations again would not be mandatory
regulations, DOE has begun to come into a role whereby they can
conduct pipeline oversight and eventually implement prescriptive
regulations. As cyber-threats become more inevitable and as DOE
obtains more authority over pipeline oversight, DOE should become
the agency to issue mandatory regulation and be the agency to
oversee the implementation of that regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the advancement of technology comes threats that were not
previously of concern. Today, natural gas pipelines faces new cyberthreats that change and evolve rapidly. Cyberattacks on the energy
grid have evolved into an active warfare tool and while the U.S. has
not yet experienced a cyberattack that resulted in loss of life or
serious infrastructure destruction, the U.S. is vulnerable and has still
experienced relatively less significant cyber intrusions. While the
U.S. has a history of passing reactive legislation after a significant
event, America should proactively equip critical energy
infrastructure with the tools they need to prevent and respond to a
cyberattack.
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The current regulatory framework to address cybersecurity
threats to natural gas pipelines is a set of voluntary guidelines
promulgated by TSA that simply encourage private industries to
comply. However, these guidelines are insufficient and will likely
be ineffective in the face of a serious cyberattack. The most effective
mechanism to protect against a significant cyberattack is to require
mandatory natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.
TSA is not the agency that should promulgate mandatory
regulations—the agency simply does not have the necessary
resources, nor expertise. Rather, DOE, the agency over all of energy
that already plays an active role in pipeline security, should
implement mandatory guidelines. Congress has increased DOE’s
oversight of energy cybersecurity. President Trump has vested DOE
with some cybersecurity authority and various agencies, including
FERC, have advocated that DOE take the lead in pipeline
cybersecurity regulations. DOE is coming into the role of pipeline
cybersecurity oversight by beginning to work with the industry to
update and increase pipeline cybersecurity, and the agency should
continue this trend by promulgating mandatory cybersecurity
regulations.

